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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, one count of theft, three counts of forgery, and one count of 
theft by receiving stolen property, all third degree felonies. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to three 
concurrent and three consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years? 
Standard of Review. "Sentencing decisions of the trial court are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, including the decision to grant or deny probation and the 
decision to impose consecutive sentences/' State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86,19, 
110 P.3d 149, cert, denied, 124 P3d 251 (Utah 2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Defendant with one count of possession of 
methamphetamine, one count of theft, one count of theft by receiving, and ten 
counts of forgery, all third degree felonies* R. 28-31. Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Defendant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, theft, theft by receiving, 
and three counts of forgery; the remaining seven forgery counts were dismissed. R. 
53-54, 56-64. After reviewing a presentence investigation report, the trial court 
sentenced Defendant to prison terms of zero-to-five years on each count and 
ordered Defendant to pay $5,000 in restitution. R. 70-77. The court ordered that 
Defendant's sentences on the three forgery convictions be served consecutively. R. 
71,75. Defendant timely appealed his sentence. R. 68-69. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On August 15, 2007, Defendant attempted to purchase merchandise at an 
AutoZone in St. George by passing a forged check. R. 91:11-12. After the store 
clerk refused to accept the check, Defendant left the store. R. 91: 12. He was 
followed out by Detective Richard Triplett, who had responded to the store after 
receiving a tip that Defendant was trying to pass a forged check using false 
identification. R. 91:11. When Defendant walked to his car and opened the trunk, 
1
 The underlying facts are taken from the preliminary hearing and the factual 
basis provided in the Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea. See R. 59. 
i 
Detective Triplett arrested him. R. 91:13-1 ^ 1*' Police discovered nv •• mpheta-
mine and a stolen laptop computer in Defendant's possession during the course of 
his arrest. R. 15-16,34. Further investigation revealed that Defendant had forged 
multiple checks totaling more than $5,000.00 R 59. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
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three counts and to concurrent prison terms of nne-to-fiftepri ye.irs i mi the remaining 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO PRISON 
After reviewing the presentence investigation report (PSI) and hearing from 
the prosecutor, Defendant, and defense counsel, the trial court sentenced Defendant 
to consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years on the three forgery convictions 
and three concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years on the remaining 
convictions. R. 70-77. On appeal, Defendant contends that although he was 
convicted of multiple charges involving multiple victims and "has a criminal history 
dating back over approximately twenty years/' the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying probation and imposing consecutive prison terms on three of six counts. 
Aplt. Brf. at 5-6. This Court should not address Defendant's argument on appeal, 
because he invited any alleged error. In any event, his claim fails on the merits. 
A. This Court should not address Defendant's challenge to his prison 
sentences, because he invited any alleged error. 
In his handwritten statement to AP&P, Defendant said, "I do not want to go 
to prison but will accept it for my actions." R. 65 (PSI): 4. And at the sentencing 
hearing, his trial counsel said, "We understand incarceration is going to be required 
because [Defendant] also has charges that he has yet to be sentenced on in Nevada. 
So there will be incarceration." R. 92:6. Now, on appeal, Defendant contends that 
"the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison rather than an 
A 
a l t e r n a t i v e s i irh .vs pmL'Mti 'in " Apl l Brf, nl h, I V'tvndcint 's c h a l l e n g e In Ins p r i s o n 
sentence should be rejected at the outset because lie invited the alleged t n i ir. 
Under the invited error doctrine, a party cannot affirmatively lead a trial court 
to believe that there is nothing wrong with a particular course of action, and •then 
complain., on appeal that the court erred in taking that action. See State v. Winfield, 
2006 - . . A error du^ irmt applies to the sentencing 
d e c i s i • \ > i >- . i 
(declining to address defendant 
erroneous because he invited any claimed error), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. State 
v. Austin, 2007 UT 55,165 P.3d 1191. Here, both Defendant and Ms trial counsel 
acknowledged the inevitability of incarceration. Accordingly, this Court should not 
L'i i tei'Ltin Uetendarit s challenge to Ms imprisonment. He "cannot take advantage of 
' * 4^ - : ro commuting 
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to AP&P that he was facing sentencing in Las Vegas, Defendant said, "It would be 
nice if all sentences ran concurrent but I do not expect this leniency, whatever the 
outcome I will humbly accept my punishment/' R. 65 (PSI): 4. Accordingly, this 
Court should also refuse to address Defendant's challenge to the consecutive prison 
sentences. 
B. Assuming arguendo Defendant did not invite the alleged error, his 
challenge to the prison sentence fails on the merits. 
Even assuming Defendant preserved his challenge to the prison sentence, the 
record demonstrates that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing 
Defendant to three consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years and three 
concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years. 
1. The trial court has broad discretion in its sentencing decision. 
Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely within the 
discretion of the [trial] court/' State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984). A 
court may sentence a defendant to pay a fine, serve time in jail or prison, and pay 
restitution. See Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(2) (West 2004). Where a defendant has 
been found guilty of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent 
or consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (West 2004). Unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law, a trial court also may sentence a defendant 
to probation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2)(c). However, the court is under no 
obligation to grant probation, "and this is so no matter how unsullied [the] 
reputation" of the defendant. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,205,310 P.2d 388,393 
(1957). 
"[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal 
judgment of the [trial] court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). In 
exercising that discretion, the trial court considers "many different ingredients," 
including "rehabilitation, . . . deterrence, punishment, restitution, and 
incapacitation," as well as the "'intangibles of [a defendant's] character, personality 
and attitude/" State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,1051,1049 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393); accord State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, f 5,73 P.3d 991. 
The court does not merely employ "a mathematical formula by which numbers of 
circumstances" govern the decision. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188,192 (Utah 1990) 
(discussing aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the context of imposing 
one of alternative minimum mandatory sentences). Rather, the "weight of 
circumstances are determinative." Id. Accordingly, "[o]ne factor in mitigation or 
aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale." Id. 
"Because so many different ingredients factor into the sentencing process, and 
because the discretionary imposition of probation rests in many cases upon 
subtleties not apparent on the face of a cold record," a sentence will not be set aside 
absent a finding that the trial court abused its "broad discretion." See Rhodes, 818 
P.2d at 1051. This Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the sentence 
"exceeds that prescribed by law," State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987,988 (Utah 1986), the 
trial judge failed to consider "all the legally relevant factors/7 State v. Schweitzer, 943 
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997), or the sentence is otherwise "inherently unfair/7 
Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051 (emphasis omitted). 
2. The trial court's prison sentence did not constitute an abuse of its 
discretion. 
A review of the record below reveals that the trial court did not abuse its 
broad discretion in not granting probation and imposing consecutive sentences for 
three of the six felony convictions. 
The trial court's sentence did not exceed statutory or constitutional limits. 
The court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five 
years on each conviction, which was the proper statutory penalty for the third 
degree felony offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004). Likewise, the 
imposition of consecutive prison sentences was permissible under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401 (West 2004). Defendant has not argued otherwise. See Aplt. Brf. at 3-6. 
The trial court considered "all the legally relevant factors." Schweitzer, 943 
P.2d at 651. Before imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court must "consider 
the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). Before 
imposing sentence in this case, the trial court "received and read" the presentence 
investigation report, which examined all these factors. R. 73. 
The PSI discussed the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, summarizing 
the facts of the case and identifying the victims. R. 65 (PSI): 3-4- The trial court 
received additional information at the sentencing hearing regarding the losses 
suffered by the victims of Defendant's check forgery scheme. R. 92:9-10. The PSI 
discussed Defendant's history. It provided a brief biographical sketch, summarized 
Defendant's educational pursuits, and observed that he suffers from a disability. R. 
65 (PSI): 6-7. It also recounted Defendant's criminal record, his prolonged failure to 
establish a permanent residence, and his inability to maintain any meaningful 
employment over the previous two years. R. 65 (PSI): 6-8. The PSI assessed 
Defendant's character and prospects of rehabilitation. It noted his history of drug 
use, his past participation in drug counseling, and his claim that he did not need 
further counseling. R. 65 (PSI): 7-8. The PSI concluded that Defendant was at high 
risk to re-offend, given his lack of any "pro-social activities," his failure to establish 
a stable residence and meaningful employment, and his poor score on the 
sentencing matrix. R. 65 (PSI): 2. The report also concluded that Defendant's 
prospects of rehabilitation were poor, where he had already served significant 
prison time in the past, but continued in unlawful behavior. R. 65 (PSI): 4. 
Finally, the trial court's sentence was not inherently unfair. A sentence is 
inherently unfair "only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the 
view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. For example, a sentence 
Q 
may be subject to reversal if a defendant "clearly show[s]" that the trial court's 
sentence was based on "some wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential 
consideration." Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393. Defendant has not made such a showing. 
Defendant first complains that contrary to Form 4 of the PSI, "continued 
criminal activity subsequent to arrest" was not an aggravating circumstance in this 
case. Aplt. Brf. at 5. The trial court, however, was made aware of this mistake at 
sentencing. Defense counsel advised the court that Defendant had been in jail since 
his arrest. R. 92: 5. Moreover, the PSI did not otherwise suggest that there were 
other charges pending since his arrest in this case. The PSI only indicated that 
Defendant had previously failed to appear in a Nevada court for sentencing on a 
felony drug offense, that he failed to participate in a presentence investigation 
interview in that case, and that he was scheduled to appear in the Utah district court 
for a fugitive review in connection with the Nevada case. R. 65 (PSI): 6. In short, the 
trial court was well aware that Defendant had not committed any other crimes since 
his arrest, but had instead been in jail. 
Defendant next argues that Form 4 of the PSI inappropriately identified drug 
involvement as an aggravating circumstance because "there was no evidence that he 
had acted under the influence of a controlled substance or that drugs in any way 
caused his criminal behavior." Aplt. Brf. at 5. Defendant did not make this specific 
objection below, see R. 92: 5, and he has not argued plain error or exceptional 
i n 
circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 3-6. Accordingly, this Court should not 
consider Defendant's challenge on appeal. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n. 
5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review unpreserved claim of error absent request for 
plain error or exceptional circumstances review). 
In any event, Defendant's objection to the drug involvement aggravator lacks 
merit. Although Defendant may not have been under the influence of drugs when 
he committed the crimes, and although drugs may not have "caused" his criminal 
behavior, Defendant's drug involvement was an aggravator nonetheless. Defendant 
admitted that the forgeries were part of a drug distribution scheme to make money: 
"[Defendant] explained that the merchandise he obtained by using forged checks 
was then traded for drugs" and "[h]e in turn sold the drugs for money to support 
him[self]." R. 65 (PSI): 8. Such drug involvement was properly credited as an 
aggravating circumstance. See People v. Beals, 643 N.E.2d 789, 797 (111. 1994) 
(recognizing as an aggravating factor in first degree murder case the fact that "the 
incident was related to the sale of drugs"). 
Defendant also contends that a 2-point error in the PSI's Criminal History 
Assessment resulted in an improper prison recommendation on the sentencing 
matrix. Aplt. Brf. at 5-6. In that Assessment, Defendant received a total placement 
score of 16 points, placing him on row V of the sentencing matrix: 
11 
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT 
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS 
(Separate Cnmmal Convictions) 
PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS 
(Separate Cnmmal Convictions) 
(Includes DUI & Reckless, Exclude Other Traffic) 
None 
One 
Two 
Three 
VIOLENCE HISTORY 0 None 
(Pnor Juvenile or Adult Conviction for an 1 Misdemeanor 
Offense Which Includes Use of a 
Weapon, Physical Force, Threat of 
| M o f e l T i ^ T J ^ t Force, or Sexual Abuse 
2 3rd Degree Felony 
4 1st Degree Felony 
None WEAPONS USE IN CURRENT 1 Const Possession 
One OFFENSE 2 Actual Possession 
Two to Four (Only When Current Conviction Does Not 3 Displayed or Brandished 
Five to Seven Reflect Weapon Use or When Statutory 4 Actual Use 
More Than Seven Enhancement is Not Involved 
PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS 0 None 
(Adjudications for Offenses that would have been 1 One 
Felonies if committed by an Adult) 2 Two to Four 
(Three Misdemeanor Adjudications Equal One 3 More than Four 
Felony Adjudication) 4 Secure Placement 
SUPERVISION RISK 0 No Escapes or Absconding 
1 Failure to Hmoti (Active Offense) or Ouistamilfig 
2 Absconded from Supervision 
3 Absconded from Residential Program 
4 Escaped from Confinement 
SUPERVISION HISTORY 
(Adult or Juvenile 
6 Injury Caused 
0 No Pnor Supervision 
1 Pnor Supervision 
2 Pnor Resident Placemnt 
3 Pnor Revocation 
Act Occurred WhifeUnder 
TOTAL PLACEMENT SCORE: 16 
k=~ IV 
III 
II 
1 
16+ _ -
~~ 12-15 
8-11 
4-7 
0-3 
PLEASE CIRCLE THE CORRECT CATEGORY 
CRIME CATEGORY 
E F G 
1st Degree J 2nd Degree J 1st Degree 3rd Degree I 1st Degree I 2nd Degree I 3rd Degree 2nd Degree I 2nd Degree I 3rd Degree | 3rd Degree 
Murder | Death | Person | Death | Other | Person | Person Other | Possession " "^"""~ 
wmmmmmm 
IV 18MOS 18MOS 16MOS 
Key Imprisonment Imprisonment fmprisonrj EfT&anctions 
Intermediate 
Sanctions 
Regular 
Probation 
See PSI, Form 1. Defendant takes issue with the 8-point assessment for "Prior 
Felony Convictions/' arguing that "the PSI was wrong in regards to at least two 
prior felonies." Aplt. Brf. at 5. He contends that absent this mistake, he would only 
have been assessed 6 points for prior felony convictions, which would "reduce [his] 
point total . . . from 16 down to 14" and "place[ ] him on level IV instead of row V." 
Aplt. Brf. at 5. He claims that "[t]his is significant because it makes probation and 
not imprisonment the recommendation on the matrix." Aplt. Brf. at 5. 
1 0 
The record does not support Defendant's claim. In the first place, the PSI in 
the record on appeal does not include the rap sheet which was included with the PSI 
at sentencing and upon which AP&P relied in assessing points. Compare R. 65 with 
R. 92: 3 (trial court noting that the PSI received by the court "had the actual rap 
sheet attached to it"). Where the trial court was made aware of the conviction 
discrepancy, see R. 92:4, and where Defendant has failed to include in the record the 
rap sheet upon which AP&P and the trial court relied, he cannot claim error in the 
conviction count. State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, <f 13, 69 P.3d 1278 (holding that 
"when an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, we presume the 
regularity of the proceedings below"). 
In the second place, the PSI itself shows at least four prior felony convictions. 
It demonstrates that Defendant had two felony convictions in Arizona—a class 3 
felony conviction and a class 4 felony conviction;2 one felony conviction in 
Nevada—the import or sale of a controlled substance; and one federal felony 
conviction—the possession of a firearm by a felon.3 See R. 65 (PSI): 4, 6; R. 92: 4. 
2
 Although Section E of the PSI indicates that Defendant was "convicted of 
two class 3 felonies and two class 4 felonies," R. 65 (PSI): 6, he asserted at sentencing 
that he was only convicted of one class 3 felony and one class 4 felony, R. 92:4. The 
convictions were rendered in one case, see R. 92:3, but the record does not disclose 
whether the two offenses were committed in one single criminal episode. 
The record indicates that Defendant served 57 months in federal prison, 
which establishes that the offense was a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) 
(felon in possession of a firearm); 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2006) (defining felony offenses as 
offenses with prison terms of more than one year). 
i a 
Accordingly, the assessment of 8 points for having more than three prior felony 
convictions, and the resulting 16 point total placement score, was not error. 
Even if Defendant dropped to a level IV on the criminal history row, resulting 
in a matrix recommendation of intermediate sanctions, there was no abuse of 
discretion in sentencing him to prison. As stated on the Criminal History 
Assessment Form itself, the recommendations on the sentencing matrix "are 
guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the 
offender." PSI, Form 1; accord State v. Thomas, 2006 UT App 106U (holding that a 
trial court is not required to follow the recommendations of a presentence report"); 
State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that "the 
recommendations of the prosecutor or any other party are not binding upon the 
court"). 
Defendant also argues that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the 
following mitigating circumstances: (1) Defendant had been crime-free for a period 
of five-to-six years; (2) the offenses were non-violent; (3) the offenses arose from a 
single criminal episode; and (4) "lengthy imprisonment would severely compromise 
his ability to make restitution." Aplt Brf. at 5-6. This argument lacks merit. 
The weight accorded the mitigating circumstances identified by Defendant is 
questionable, at best. Defendant had spent at least ten of his previous twenty years 
of life in prison. See R. 65 (PSI): 6. Although he enjoyed a crime-free period of five 
1 A 
or six years, it ended in Nevada with his felony conviction for drug distribution- R. 
65 (PSI): 6. Defendant then failed to appear at his sentencing, absconded to Utah, 
and went on a crime spree here. See R. 65 (PSI): 3,6. Although his Utah crime spree 
was not violent, it affected multiple victims and included, by Defendant's own 
admission, the distribution of drugs. R. 65 (PSI): 3, 6, 8. Finally, imprisonment 
would not, as Defendant contends, severely affect his ability to pay restitution, 
where he was homeless and had been unable to hold down steady employment for 
two years in any event. See R. 65 (PSI): 7. Given these circumstances, and defense 
counsel's implicit acknowledgement that prison was inevitable, it cannot be said 
that no reasonable person would impose the sentence adopted by the trial court. See 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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